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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
PRACTICE-SPECIAL APPEARANCE IN A FEDERAL COURT-EFFECT
A decision 1 by the United
OF THE CONFORMITY ACT.-[Federal]

States district court presents several interesting questions. The suit
was brought in the federal court against a foreign corporation, and
the officer's return showed service on defendant's agent.
Defendant appeared specially by attorney and moved to quash
the service on the ground that the person served was not in fact the
defendant's agent. The plaintiff resisted the motion principally on
the ground that it was in effect to a plea to the jurisdiction, and,
under the established rule in Illinois, which the Conformity act required the court to follow, such a plea or motion by attorney
amounted to a general appearance and submission to the jurisdiction.
The court thought that the proper disposition of the motion
turned on two questions:
First, whether, assuming the Illinois practice to be as contended
bkv plaintiff, the Conformity act required the federal court to follow it.
Second, whether, if not constrained by the Conformity act, the
court should apply the rule invoked by plaintiff on general principles of common law procedure.
Answering both questions in the negative, the court quashed the
return.
According to the English common law the sheriff's return of
service was conclusive and could not be contradicted either by
motion 2 or plea. 3 The sole remedy was an action on the case against
the officer for a false return.
This harsh rule may have resulted, in part, at least, from the
dislike of the court to try the question on motion and affidavits, and
the fact that logically there could not be a jury trial of such an
issue. To have an issue triable by jury a plea would be necessary,
but there was no appropriate plea for that purpose.
If a return was vacated, or quashed for defects on its face,
that did not abate the action or defeat the jurisdiction, because the
plaintiff might have an alias summons.'
A false return, assuming that the falsity could in some way be
made to appear, would have no greater effect to abate the action than
if the return had truly stated the facts, which would then appear
insufficient in law.
Whatever may be the explanation, the rule that the return was
conclusive, was felt to be harsh and oppressive, and to work badly.
Why should the party be forced to bring an action for damages for
1. Joseph Frackman Co. v. Lloyds 7 Fed. (2nd) 620 (East Dist. ILl).

2. Barr v. Satchwell (1729) 2 Strange 813; Goubot v. DeCrouy (1833)
1 Cr. & M. 772; Hollowell v. Page (1857) 24 Mo. 590.
3. Flud v. Pennington (1601) Cro. Eliz. 872; Slayton v. Chester (1808)
4 Mass. 478; Stenson v. Snow (1833) 10 Me. 263; Columbian Granite Co. v.
Tousend (1902) 74 Vt. 183; Gould "Pleading" (3rd ed.) ch. V sec. 135.

4. Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476; Pratt v. Harris295 I1. 504.
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a false return, when damage might be obviated by allowing the
truth of the return to be questioned in the original action?
In the United States there has been a strong tendency to break
away from the doctrine that the truth of a return was not contestable.
In an early Illinois case 5 there is a dictum that a return is not conclusive on the fact of agency. In a later case it was decided that
the truth of a return was open to contest. The reasoning by which
this seemingly desirable result was reached is rather curious.
The court examined several cases where courts of chancery had
given relief against default judgments based on false returns, and
from these concluded that the matter was open to dispute at law.
As a matter of fact, chancery gave relief because the truth of the
return was not open to dispute at law, except in an action against
the officer.
If the fiction, that equity follows the law, were reversed and
turned into the proposition that the law follows equity, it would
more nearly accord with the actual judicial process.
It has frequently been assumed that the Supreme Court of the
United States follows the view that the return is not conclusive, but
the cases usually cited7 leave the matter in doubt, because of the
further fact that in each instance the defendant was an absent nonresident.
Where the truth of the return is open to contest, the question
naturally arose as to how the issue should be raised, whether by
motion or plea.
The obvious and natural method was by motion to quash. the
return of service since the object was to get rid of the false return,
leaving the action to proceed by alias summons. And it is no objection to the use of a motion that a question of fact is involved.
Courts decide all sorts of questions of fact on motions.8
Pleas in abatement, and pleas to the jurisdiction in the nature
of plea in abatement, are based on the theory that the action has
been misbrought, which is not the point in such cases. However,
in the Mineral Point Railroad case9 it was assumed that a plea was
appropriate, and that apparently has been the accepted practice in
Illinois ever since.
There would be a serious practical objection to this view but
for the saving grace of sec. 45 of the Practice act. When a motion
directed at the- process or return is overruled, the defendant may
plead in bar as a matter of right.10 The same thing is true where
5. Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep (1859) 22 Ill. 9.
6. Sibert v. Thorp (1875) 77 Ill. 43.
7. Wabash Ry. v. Brow (1896) 164 U. S. 271; Mechanical Appliance
Co. v. Castleman (1910) 215 U. S. 437.
8. For example, motions for a continuance, motions to quash the panel,
motions for a new trial, etc.
9. Mineral Point R. Co. v. Keep (1859) 22 Ill. 9.
10. Whether a subsequent plea waives an exception to the ruling on the
motion is a question on which the courts differ. The federal courts hold
that the exception is not waived: Harkness v. Hyde (1878) 98 U. S. 476.
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a plea in abatement is held bad on demurrer, because the judgment
in that event is respondeat ouster. But at common law when issue
was taken on a plea in abatement and found for the plaintiff, the
judgment was final, that the plaintiff recover.1 Hence, by pleading
in abatement a defendant had to take the chance of being cut off
from any defense to the merits. This has been changed in Illinois
contesting the truth of the return, or
in case of pleas in abatement
2
attacking the venue.1
In the federal courts a motion to quash has been recognized as
the proper method to attack the truth of the return.. 3
The Illinois courts appear to require a plea to the jurisdiction,
and apply to it that archaic rule, that where jurisdiction could be
conferred by consent, such pleas must be pleaded in person instead
of by attorney; and that such a plea by attorney amounts to a
general appearance, thereby waiving the objection attempted to be
set up."
That was undoubtedly the ancient rule of the English courts,
and is so stated, without explanation, in Williams' Saunders and
Chitty. The old cases throw no light on the point. Bacon's Abridgement gives the only explanation which the writer has been able to
find:
"The defendant must plead in propria persona, for he can not plead
by attorney without leave of court first had, which leave acknowledges
the jurisdiction; for the attorney is an officer of the court; and if the
defendant puts in a plea by an officer of5 the court, that plea must be supposed to be put in by leave of court."'
If this is the true reason, it would apply equally to a motion by
attorney to quash a return for defects on its face, because it was
the appearance by attorney which required leave of court, and not
the kind of step taken.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has allowed a motion by attorney to quash a return for defects on its face, and thus limited the
rule to cases of objections requiring extrinsic proof."6
Many of the state courts hold that a subsequent plea in bar waives the
exception: Eddlemnan v. Traction Co. (1905) 217 Ill. 409; Newcomb v. Ry.
(1904) 182 Mo. 687.
11. Thompson v. Colier (1608) Yel. 112.
12. If the issue on any plea in abatement is the truth of a statement in
the return on a summons, or that the defendant is sued out of his proper
county, or is not subject to suit in the county in which the suit is brought,
or that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and
such issue is found against the defendant, the judgment shall be respondeat
ouster: Hurd's Rev. Stat. ch. 110 sec. 45.
This statute impliedly sanctions the use of a plea in abatement for this
purpose.
13. Higham v. State Travelers' Assn. (1911)
14. Pratt v. Harris (1920) 295 Ill. 504.
15. Bacon "Abridgment" I 2.

183 Fed. 845.

16. L. & N. Ry. v. Industrial Board (1917) 282 I1. 136.
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If the federal courts are free to decide the question on general
they are no longer
principles of procedure they might well hold that
17
bound by the "dead hand of the common law.'
If the rule is really based on the theory of leave of court to
appear by attorney, it would seem inapplicable to conditions in the
United States where appearance by attorney has come to be regarded
as a matter of right.
If the leave of court theory is not the true explanation of the
requirement that such pleas be made in person, then the rule is
simply a survival of a forgotten practice, no longer serving any
purpose but to entrap the unwary, and might well be abandoned as
out of harmony with modern procedure.
This appears to be the first case in which a federal court has
been called on to determine whether the ancient rule is still a part
of the living law of procedure. The cases cited"5 in the opinion
as sanctioning motions by attorney to quash or vacate false and
defective returns are not particularly in point. They all arose in
code states, and the motions were probably made by attorney, but
that fact was not noticed or questioned. In all probability the practitioners under the code who were engaged in these cases had long
since forgotten such matters of common law technique.
But no matter how obsolete the rule has become elsewhere, it
is still alive in Illinois.19 The important question then is whether
the Conformity act"° requires a federal court in Illinois to follow it.
It has been held that in the service of process the federal court
must conform to the state rule, because that is a matter of practice
and procedure, and hence that a federal court could not acquire
by a method of service not authorized by the state
jurisdiction
2
law.

This does not mean that the federal court is bound to recognize service in accordance with the state rule as necessarily valid,
because such service might be contrary to the due process2 2 clause
of the constitution.
So a state rule converting an attempted special appearance into
a general appearance might conceivably violate the due process
clause,23 or might be invalid as unreasonably restricting the asser17. Rosen v. U. S. (1918) 245 U. S. 467.
18. Harkness v. Hyde 98 U. S. 476; Goldey v. Morning News 156 U. S.
518; Meisukas v. Greenough Coal Co. 244 U. S. 54; l inter v. Weil 261 U. S.
276; General Inv't Co. v. Ry. 260 U. S. 261.
19. Pratt v. Harris (1920) 295 Ill. 504.
20. The practice, pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding in civil
causes, other than equity and admiralty causes, in the Circuit and District
courts, shall conform as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms
and modes of proceeding existing at the time in like causes in courts of
record of the state within which such Circuit or District courts are held,
any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding: U. S. Rev. Stat. sec. 914.
21. Amy v. Watertown (1888) 130 U. S. 301.
22. Minnesota Ass'n v. Benn (1923) 261 U. S. 140.
23. So far the attacks on a state rule on this point as violation of the
due process clause here failed: York v. Texas (1890) 137 U. S. 15; Western
Life Co. v. Rupp (1914) 235 U. S.261.
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tion of24 a privilege or immunity under the laws of the United
States.
The rule in question, requiring an attack on jurisdiction over
the person to be made in person and its corollary, that such an
attack by attorney operates as a submission, is clearly a matter of
practice, regulating the form and mode of proceeding in certain
cases. It can not be pretended that it violates the due process clause
or unreasonably restricts the assertion of a federal right or immunity, because it was a part of the common law from which we
derive our notions of due process and unreasonableness.
If the words of the Conformity act mean anything, it would
seem obligatory on the federal courts to follow the state rule on this
point. But in two instances, at least, the Supreme Court has announced broadly
that on a similar question the Conformity act was
2
not binding.
Whether these statements can be regarded as anything more
than dicta is questionable. In the Meisukas case suit was brought
in the federal court in the Eastern district of New York against a
Pennsylvania corporation, alleged to be doing business in New
York, and the process was served on the defendant's president while
in New York.
Defendant appeared specially and moved to vacate the return
on the ground that it was not doing business in New York, and that
its president, while in New York was not representing it. Amongst
other objections of this motion, the plaintiff contended that according
to the New York practice the defendant should have used a demurrer, and that the Conformity act required the same practice in
the federal court.
The Supreme Court did not undertake to determine what the
New York practice was, but announced that its previous decisions
had sanctioned the use of a motion, citing several cases. 26 It may
be noted that in the cases cited, it was not suggested that a motion
was not permitted by the local practice. In the Meisukas case the
contention that the New York rule required a demurrer seems untenable. It is true that the New York Code2 7 made want of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant a ground of demurrer.

But the lack of jurisdiction in that case did not appear on the face

of the complaint, and therefore could not have been reached by
demurrer. In the absence of any New York cases holding that a
motion could not be used for the purpose, the Meisukas case is very
24. Davis v. Wechsler (1923)
45 Sup. Ct. Rep. 104.

263 U. S. 22; Davis v. O'Harra (1924)
For comments on such cases see ILL. LAW REv. 19:

567.
25. Afeisakas v. Greenough Coal Co. (1917) 244 U. S. 54; Minter v.
Weil Corset Co. (1923) 261 U. S. 276.
26. Goldey v. Morning News 156 U. S. 518; Wabash Ry. v. Brow 164
U. S. 271; St. Louis Ry. v. Alexander 227 U. S. 218.
27. "The defendant may demur to the complaint, where one or more
of the following objections thereto appear upon the face thereof: That the

court has not jurisdiction of the person-of the defendant: Code Civil
Procedure sec. 488.
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slender authority for the proposition that the Conformity act does
not require a federal court to conform to the local practice as near
as practicable.
In the Minter case the facts were these: Suit was brought in a
federal court for the District of Connecticut, and the process was
served on the defendant, as appeared by the return, in the state of
New York. The defendant appeared specially and moved to strike
the case from the docket. The plaintiff insisted that, according to
the Connecticut practice, the objection should have been taken by
plea. This contention seems untenable. Doubtless a plea to the
jurisdiction might have been used, but the writer has been unable to
find anything in the Connecticut practice act, or in the Connecticut
decisions prohibiting the use of a motion based on objections apparent on the face of a return.
Without considering what the Connecticut rule of practice was
on the point, the Supreme Court held that a motion was available
for the purpose, observing:
"We have decided in cases which concern the jurisdiction of the
federal courts that notwithstanding the Conformity Act, neither the
statutes of the States nor the decisions of their courts are conclusive
upon the federal courts, the determination of such questions being 'in
this court alone': Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman 215 U. S.

437, 443."

Unless the Connecticut law did not permit the use of such a
notion, which seems unlikely, there was no failure to conform, and
the statement, that the Conformity act was not binding, appears to
be a dictum which finds little support in the case 29 from which the
quotation was taken. In that case suit was brought against a Wisconsin corporation in a state court in Missouri. The sheriff's return
showed service on the defendant's agent, apparently as authorized by
the local Practice act.
The defendant removed the case to the federal court, and then
pleaded that it was a foreign corporation, not doing business in
Missouri, and that the person served was not its agent, etc.
The plaintiff contended that this question could not be raised
because the law of Missouri made the sheriff's return conclusive.
Notwithstanding the local law, this contention was clearly untenable.
If the plea was true, the state court could not by a false 2return
9
acquire jurisdiction over the person of an absent non-resident.
Under the due process clause the defendant was entitled to
resist the attempt to exercise jurisdiction where none existed. Of
course the Conformity act did not require the federal court to follow a state rule which denied to the defendant due process.
28. Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman (1910) 215 U. S. 437.
29. Knowles v. Gas & Coke Co. (1873) 86 U. S. 58. In the case of a
resident the state rule making the return conclusive, and limiting the remedy

to an action against the officer does not violate due process: Meidrich v.
Lauenstein (1914) 232 U. S. 236.
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In deciding this problem Mr. Justice Day used the following
language:
"Moreover in cases which concern the jurisdiction bf the Federal
courts, notwithstanding the so-called Conformity Act, Revised -Stats.
section 914, neither the statutes of the State nor the decisions of its
courts are conclusive upon the Federal courts. The ultimate determination of such questions of jurisdiction is for this court alone."
The question was not how the defendant might resist the attempted exercise of jurisdiction, but whether it might do so at all.
The problem was not one of method of procedure, but of substantive
right under the Fourteenth amendment.
The writer, however, is unable to see why this eminently sound
doctrine should lead to the conclusion that the Conformity act is
inapplicable where the sole question is as to the proper steps to be
taken in raising an objection to process or the return of service,
where the state rule merely excludes one of several possible methods.
But, as a matter of experience, we know that a repeated dictum
is apt to become the basis of a decision.
So the language of Mr. Justice Day seems destined to create a
new exception to the Conformity act.
E. W. HINTON.

